Abstract-In this paper, we study a class of risk-sensitive mean-field stochastic differential games. We show that under appropriate regularity conditions, the mean-field value of the stochastic differential game with exponentiated integral cost functional coincides with the value function satisfying a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation with an additional quadratic term. We provide an explicit solution of the mean-field best response when the instantaneous cost functions are log-quadratic and the state dynamics are affine in the control. An equivalent mean-field risk-neutral problem is formulated and the corresponding mean-field equilibria are characterized in terms of backward-forward macroscopic McKean-Vlasov equations, Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov equations, and HJB equations. We provide numerical examples on the mean field behavior to illustrate both linear and McKean-Vlasov dynamics.
I. INTRODUCTION

M
OST formulations of mean-field (MF) models such as anonymous sequential population games [8] , [22] , MF stochastic control [18] , [20] , [41] , MF optimization, MF teams [37] , MF stochastic games [1] , [35] , [37] , [39] , MF stochastic difference games [16] , and MF stochastic differential games [15] , [26] , [36] have been of risk-neutral type where the cost (or payoff, utility) functions to be minimized (or to be maximized) are the expected values of stage-additive loss functions.
Not all behavior, however, can be captured by risk-neutral cost functions. One way of capturing risk-seeking or risk-averse behavior is by exponentiating loss functions before expectation (see [3] , [21] and the references therein).
The particular risk-sensitive mean-field stochastic differential game that we consider in this paper involves an exponential term in the stochastic long-term cost function. This approach was first taken by Jacobson in [21] , when considering the risksensitive Linear-Quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) problem with state feedback. Jacobson demonstrated a link between the exponential cost criterion and deterministic linear-quadratic differential games. He showed that the risk-sensitive approach provides a method for varying the robustness of the controller and noted that in the case of no risk, or risk-neutral case, the well-known LQR solution would result (see, for follow-up work on risksensitive stochastic control problems with noisy state measurements, [7] , [30] , [40] ). We examine here the risk-sensitive stochastic differential game in a regime of large population of players. We first present a mean-field stochastic differential game model where the players are coupled not only via their risk-sensitive cost functionals but also via their states. The main coupling term is the mean-field process, also called the occupancy process or population profile process. Each player reacts to the mean field or a subset of the mean field generated by the states of some groups of players, and at the same time the mean field evolves according to a controlled Kolmogorov forward equation.
Our contribution can be summarized as follows. Using a particular structure of state dynamics, we derive the mean-field limit of the individual state dynamics leading to a nonlinear controlled macroscopic McKean-Vlasov equation [24] . Combining this with a limiting risk-sensitive cost functional, we arrive at a framework where the mean-field response can be characterized, and establish its compatibility with the density distribution using the controlled Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov forward equation. The mean-field equilibria are then characterized by coupled backward-forward equations. In general a backwardforward system may not have solution (a simple example is provided in Section III-D). But in the case of the affine-exponentiated-Gaussian mean-field game, we provide an explicit solution of the corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation. We further formulate an equivalent risk-neutral mean-field problem (in terms of the value function), and characterize the solution of the mean-field game. Finally, we provide a sufficiency condition for having at most one smooth solution to the risk-sensitive mean field system in the local sense.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we first describe the general model adopted in the paper (Section II-A), and then provide an overview of the mean-field convergence result (Section II-B), and finally introduce the cost (Section II-C). In Section III, we introduce the risk-sensitive mean-field stochastic differential game formulation and its equivalences. In Section IV, we analyze a special class of risk-sensitive mean-field games where the state dynamics are linear and independent of the mean field. In Section V, we provide a numerical example, and Section VI concludes the paper. Two appendices provide background on the important property of indistinguishability, and proofs of some of the main results in the main body of the paper. We summarize some of the notations used in the paper in Table I . 
II. PROBLEM SETTING
A. General Description of the Game Dynamics
We consider a class of -person stochastic differential games, where Player 's individual state, , evolves according to the Itô stochastic differential (S) as follows, for :
where is the -dimensional state of Player ; , is the control of Player at time with being a subset of the -dimensional Euclidean space ; are mutually independent standard Brownian motion processes in ; and is a small positive parameter, which will play a role in the analysis in later sections. We will assume in (S) that there is some symmetry in and , in the sense that there exist and (conditions on which will be specified shortly) such that for all and Cucker-Smale Dynamics) : Consider a population, say a flock of birds (or a swarm of fish) that move in a three-dimensional space. It has been observed that for some initial conditions, for example on their positions and velocities, the state of the flock converges to one in which all birds fly with the same velocity. See, for example, Cucker-Smale flocking dynamics [9] , [10] where each vector is composed of position dynamics and velocity dynamics of the corresponding bird (player). With in (S), where , and an odd continuous function, one arrives at a generic class of consensus algorithms developed for flocking problems.
Example 3 (Temperature Dynamics for Energy-Efficient Buildings): Consider a heating system serving a finite number of zones. In each zone, the goal is to maintain the temperature at a certain level. Denote by the temperature of zone , and by the ambient temperature. The law of conservation of energy can be written down as described by the following equation for zone :
where denotes the input rate of the heater in zone is the thermal conductance between zone and zone , and is a small variance term. The evolution of the temperature has a McKean-Vlasov structure of the type in system (S). We can actually introduce a control variable into such that the heater can be turned on and off in each zone.
The three examples above can be viewed as special cases of the system (S). The controlled dynamics in (S) allows one to address several interesting questions, such as: How to control the flocking dynamics and consensus algorithms in the first two examples above to a certain target? How to control the temperature in the third example in order to achieve a specific thermal comfort level while minimizing energy cost? In order to define the controlled dynamical system in precise terms, we have to specify the nature of information that players are allowed in the choice of their control at each point in time. This brings us to the first definition below.
Definition 1: A state-feedback strategy for Player is a mapping , whereas an individual state-feedback strategy for Player is a mapping . Note that the individual state-feedback strategy involves only the self state of a player, whereas the state-feedback strategy involves the entire -dimensional state vector. The individual strategy spaces in each case have to be chosen in such a way that the resulting system of stochastic differential (S) admits a unique solution (in the sense specified shortly) when the players pick their strategies independently; furthermore, as standard, we take the strategy sets to be time invariant and independent of the controls. We denote by the set of such admissible control laws for Player ; a similar set, , is defined for state-feedback strategies of Player .
We assume the following standard conditions on , and the action sets , for all .
is in , and Lipschitz in . Assumption (ii): The entries of the matrix are and is strictly positive; Assumption (iii): and are uniformly bounded;
is non-empty, closed, and bounded;
is piecewise continuous in and Lipschitz in .
Normally, when we have a cost function for Player , which depends also on the state variables of the other players, either directly, or implicitly through the coupling of the state dynamics [as in (S)], then any state-feedback Nash equilibrium solution will generally depend not only on self states but also on the other states, i.e., it will not be in the set . However, since this paper aims to characterize the solution in the high-population regime (i.e., as ), the dependence on other players' states will be only through the distribution of the player states. Hence each player will respond (in an optimal, cost minimizing manner) to the behavior of the mass population and not to behaviors of individual players. Validity of this claim will be established later in Section III, but in anticipation of this, we first introduce the quantity (1) as an empirical measure of the collection of states of the players, where is a Dirac measure on the state space. This enables us to introduce the long-term cost function of Player (to be minimized by him) in terms of only the self variables ( and ) and the mass , where the latter can be viewed as an exogenous process (not directly influenced by Player ). But we first introduce a mean-field representation of the dynamics (S), which depends on , and will be used in the description of the cost.
B. Mean-Field Representation
The system (S) can be written into a measure representation using the formula [43, ch. 9] where is a Dirac measure concentrated at , is a measurable bounded function defined on the state space, and . Then, the system (S) reduces to the system which, by (1), is equivalent to the following system (SM):
The above representation of the system (SM) can be seen as a controlled interacting particles representation of a macroscopic McKean-Vlasov equation where represents the discrete density of the population. Next, we address the mean field convergence of the population profile process . To do so, we introduce the key notion of indistinguishability, which is a basic property of our model. For the benefit of the reader, we discuss below the existence of a limiting measure and mean-field convergence in the framework of de Finetti-Hewitt-Savage [2] , [12] , [17] (see Appendix I).
Definition 2 (Indistinguishability): We say that a family of processes is indistinguishable (or exchangeable) if the law of is invariant by permutation over the index set , i.e., for any permutation over , one has L L , where L denotes the law of the random variable . Observing that the index does not matter in the functions and , the key term that drives the dynamics is the process whose distribution remains unchanged by permutation. The next lemma follows immediately.
Lemma 1: A solution of (S) (and hence of (SM)) obtained under homogeneous control strategies , i.e., for all , generates indistinguishable processes. For indistinguishable (exchangeable) processes, the convergence of the empirical measure has been studied extensively. We have provided in Appendix I the fundamental result as Theorem 4; see also [33] and the references therein. To preserve this property for the controlled system we restrict ourselves to admissible homogeneous control strategies. Then, from Theorem 4, the mean field convergence becomes equivalent to the existence of a random measure such that the system is -chaotic, i.e., for any fixed natural number and a collection of measurable bounded functions defined over the state space .
Following the indistinguishability property, one has that the law of is . Knowing that goes to in law, the individual state process conditioned on becomes independent of the system size and hence has a limiting process as grows. The distribution of is obtained through the weak convergence of the individual state dynamics to a macroscopic McKean-Vlasov equation (see later Proposition 5). Then, when the initial states are i.i.d. and given some homogeneous control actions , the solution of the state dynamics generates an indistinguishable random process and the weak convergence of the population profile process to is equivalent to -chaoticity.
Note that processes depend implicitly on the strategies used by the players, and that an admissible control law may depend on time , the value of the individual state and the mean-field process . The weak convergence of the process implies the weak convergence of its marginal to and one can characterize the distribution of by the Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov (FPK) equation:
Here , which denotes by , where is scalar. We let is a square matrix with dimension . The term denotes and the last term on is
In the one-dimensional case, the terms reduce to the divergence "div" and the Laplacian operator , respectively.
It is important to note that the existence of a unique rest point (distribution) in FPK does not automatically imply that the mean-field converges to the rest point when goes to infinity. This is because the rest point may not be stable.
Remark 1: In mathematical physics, convergence to an independent and identically distributed system is sometimes referred to as chaoticity [13] , [32] , [33] , and the fact that chaoticity at the initial time leads to chaoticity at further times is known as propagation of chaos. In our setting, however, the chaoticity property needs to be studied together with the controls of the players. In general the chaoticity property may not hold. One particular case should be mentioned, which is when the rest point is related to the -chaoticity. If the mean-field dynamics has a unique global attractor , then the propagation of chaos property holds for the measure . Beyond this particular case, one may have multiple rest points and also the double limit,
, may depend on the order of the limiting operations, leading a noncommutative diagram; for an instance of this, see [34] .
C. Cost Structure
We now introduce the cost functions associated with the differential game. Risk-sensitive behaviors can be captured by cost functions which exponentiate loss functions before the expectation operator. For each , and initialized at a generic feasible pair at , the risk-sensitive cost function for Player is given by (3) where is the instantaneous cost at time ; is the terminal cost;
is the risk-sensitivity index; denotes the process ; and , with . Note that because of the symmetry assumption across players, the cost function of Player is not indexed by , since it is in the same structural form for all players. This is still a game problem (and not a team problem), however, because each such cost function depends only on the self variables (indexed by for Player ) as well as the common population variable . We invoke the following standard conditions on and .
Assumption (vi) : is in ; is in ; are nonnegative; Assumption (vii): are uniformly bounded. The cost function (3) is called a risk-sensitive cost functional or an exponentiated integral cost, which measures risk-sensitivity for the long-run and not at each instant of time (see [3] , [7] , [21] , [40] ). We note that the McKean-Vlasov mean field game considered here differs from the model in [19] ; specifically, in this paper, the volatility term in (SM) is a function of state, control and the mean field, and further, the cost functional is of the risk-sensitive type.
Remark 2 (Connection With Mean-Variance Cost): Consider the function
. It is obvious that the risk-sensitive cost takes into consideration all the moments of the cost , and not only its mean value. Around zero, the Taylor expansion of is given by where, for small , the dominating terms are the mean value and the variance of the cost. Hence risk-sensitive cost entails a weighted sum of the mean and variance of the cost, to some level of approximation.
With the dynamics (SM) and cost functionals as introduced, we seek an individual state-feedback noncooperative Nash equilibrium , satisfying the set of inequalities (4) for all , where is generated by the 's, and by , ;
and are control actions generated by control laws and , respectively, i.e., and ; laws are given by the forward FPK equation under the strategy , and is the induced measure under the strategy . A more stringent equilibrium solution concept is that of strongly time-consistent individual state-feedback Nash equilibrium, satisfying (5) for all . Note that the two measures and differ only in the component and have a common term which is , which converges in distribution to some measure with a distribution which is a solution of the forward PFK partial differential equation.
III. RISK-SENSITIVE BEST RESPONSE TO MEAN-FIELD, AND EQUILIBRIUM
In this section, we present the risk-sensitive mean-field results. We first provide an overview of the mean-field (feedback) best response for a given mean-field trajectory . A mean-field best-response strategy of a generic Player to a given mean field is a measurable mapping satisfying: , with and initialized at , respectively where law of is given by the forward FPK equation in the whole space , and is an exogenous process. Let . The next proposition establishes the risk-sensitive Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation of the risk-sensitive cost function satisfied by a smooth optimal value function of a generic player. The main difference from the standard HJB equation is the presence of the term . We refer the reader to [7] , [29] , [30] for a formal derivation of this standard HJB equation for .
To establish the connection with the risk-sensitive value function , we use the relation and compute the partial derivatives of in terms of the partial derivatives of :
and where the latter immediately yields
Note that the term is strictly positive. Collecting terms together, and dividing by , we arrive at the risk-sensitive HJB (6) .
A minimizer of the risk-sensitive Hamiltonian is a best response (feedback) strategy to the mean field .
Remark 3:
The fact that the payoff function and the dynamics and are linear in the measure allows one to use the iterated law of conditional expectation. However, there may be a time inconsistency in the sense that Bellman's optimality principle for payoff that are nonlinear in the measure (see [34] ).
Remark 4: Let us introduce the Hamiltonian as for a vector and a matrix which is the same as the Hessian of .
If does not depend on the control variable(s), then the above expression reduces to and the term to be minimized is , which is related to the Legendre-Fenchel transform [31] for linear dynamics, i.e., the case where is linear in the control . In that case for some nonsingular matrix of proper dimensions. This says that the derivative of the modified Hamiltonian is related to the optimal feedback control. Now, for the nonlinear drift , the same technique can be used but the function needs to be inverted to obtain a generic closed-form expression for the optimal feedback control, which is given by where is the inverse of the map This generic expression of the optimal control will play an important role in nonlinear McKean-Vlasov mean-field games.
The next proposition provides the best-response control to the affine-quadratic in -exponentiated cost-Gaussian mean-field game, and the proposition that follows it deals with the case of affine-quadratic structure (in both and ). 
A. Macroscopic McKean-Vlasov Equation
Since the controls used by the players influence the mean-field limit via the state dynamics, we need to characterize the evolution of the mean-field limit as a function of the controls. The law of is the solution of the Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov equation given by (2) , and the individual state dynamics follows the so-called macroscopic McKean-Vlasov equation (8) In order to obtain an error bound, we introduce the following: Definition 3 (Monge-Kantorovich Metric): Given two measures and , the Monge-Kantorovich metric (also called Wasserstein metric) between and is In other words, if is the set of probability measures on the product space such that the image of under the projection on the first argument (respectively, on the second argument) is (respectively, ), then
The Monge-Kantorovich metric is indeed a distance measure (it can be checked that the separation, the triangle inequality and positivity properties are satisfied), and it metricizes the weak topology.
Proposition 5: Under the conditions (i)-(vii), the following holds: For any , if the control law is used, then there exists such that Moreover, for any , there exists such that where denotes the law of the random variable . The last inequality in the proposition says that the error bound is at most of for any fixed compact interval. The proof of this result follows the following steps (details are given in Appendix II): Let and be the solutions of the two SDEs with initial gap less than . Then, taking the difference between the two solutions, using triangle inequality of norms, taking expectation, and using the Gronwall inequality one arrives at the result.
1) Risk-Sensitive Mean-Field Cost:
Based on the fact that converges weakly to under the admissible controls when goes to infinity, the weak convergence of the risk-sensitive cost function (3) follows, under the regularity conditions (vi) and (vii) on functions and , i.e., as Based on this limiting cost, we can construct the best response to mean field in the limit. Given , we minimize subject to the state-dynamics constraints.
B. Fixed-Point Problem
We now define the mean-field game as the following fixedpoint problem.
Definition 4: The mean field equilibrium game problem (P) is one where each player solves the best response problem subject to the dynamics of given by the dynamics in Section III-A, where the mean field is replaced by , and is the mean of the optimal mean-field trajectory. The optimal feedback control depends on , and is the mean field reproduced by all the , i.e., solution of the Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov forward (2). The equilibrium is called an individual feedback mean-field equilibrium if every player adopts an individual state-feedback strategy.
Note that this problem differs from the risk-sensitive mean field stochastic optimal control problem where the objective is with the distribution of the state dynamics driven by the control .
C. Risk-Sensitive FPK-McV Equations
The regular solutions to problem (P) introduced above are solutions to the HJB backward equation combined with the FPK equation and macroscopic McKean-Vlasov version of the limiting individual dynamics, i.e., Then, the relevant question that arises is the existence of a solution to the above system. This is a backward-forward system, and little is known about the existence of a solution to such a system. In general, a solution may not exist as we next demonstrate.
D. Possibility of Nonexistence of a Solution to Backward-Forward Boundary Value Problems
There are many examples of systems of backward-forward equations which do not admit solutions. As a very simple example from [42] , consider the system It is obvious that the coefficients of this pair of backward-forward differential equations are all (trivially) uniformly Lipschitz. However, depending on , this may not be solvable for . We can easily show that for ( , a nonnegative integer), the above two-point boundary value problem does not admit a solution for any and it admits infinitely many solutions for . Following essentially the same ideas, one can show that the system of stochastic differential equations where is the standard Brownian motion in , and with the initial conditions and with , does not admit any solution. This example demonstrates that the system needs to be normalized and the boundary conditions need to be properly picked. In view of this, we will introduce the notion of a reduced meanfield system in Section IV to establish the existence of equilibrium for a specific class of risk-sensitive games. We first provide below a key result covering the most general case. [4] , [26] , [28] for discussions). To do so, consider a finite number of classes indexed by . The individual dynamics are then indexed by , i.e. the function becomes , and becomes . This means that the indistinguishability property is not satisfied anymore. The law depends on (it is not invariant by permutation of index). However, the invariance property holds within each class. This allows us to establish a weak convergence of the individual dynamics of each generic player for each class, and we obtain . The multi-class mean-field equilibrium is then defined by a system for each class and the classes are interdependent via the mean field and the value functions per class.
E. Risk-Sensitive Mean-Field Equilibrium
Limiting Behavior With Respect to : We scale the parameters , and such that . The PDE given in Proposition 1 then becomes When the parameter goes to zero, one arrives at a deterministic PDE. This situation captures the large deviation limit
F. Equivalent Stochastic Mean-Field Problem
In this subsection, we formulate an equivalent -player game in which the state dynamics of the players are given by the system (ESM) as follows:
where is the control parameter of the "fictitious" th player. In parallel to (3), we define the risk-neutral cost function of the players as follows: (10) where is the individual feedback control strategy of the fictitious Player , which yields an admissible control action in a set of feasible actions . Every player minimizes under the worst choice of feedback strategy by player , which is piecewise continuous in and Lipschitz in . We refer to this game described by (ESM) and (10) as the robust mean-field game. In the following Proposition, we describe the connection between the mean-field risk-sensitive game problem described in (SM) and (3) and the robust mean-field game problem described in (ESM) and (10), Proposition 6: Under the regularity assumptions (i)-(vii), given a mean field , the value functions of the risk-sensitive game and the robust game problems are identical, and the mean-field best-response control strategy of the risk-sensitive stochastic differential game is identical to the one for the corresponding robust mean-field game.
Proof: Let denote the upper-value function associated with this robust mean-field game. Then, under the regularity assump-
is in and in , it satisfies the Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs (HJI) equation (11) Note that (11) can be rewritten as , where is the Hamiltonian associated with this robust game. Since the dependences on and above are separable, the Isaacs condition (see [5] ) holds, i.e., and hence the function satisfies the following after computing and substituting back the best-response strategy for : (12) Note that the two PDEs, (12) and the one given in Proposition 1, are identical, with . Moreover, the optimal cost and the optimal control laws in the two problems are the same.
Remark 6: The FPK forward equation will have to be modified to account for the control of fictitious player in the robust mean-field game formulation, by including the term in (ESM). Hence the mean-field equilibrium solutions to the two games are not necessarily identical.
IV. LINEAR STATE DYNAMICS
In this section, we study a special class of risk-sensitive games where state dynamics are linear and do not depend explicitly on the mean field. We first state a related result from [14] , [27] for the risk-neutral case.
Theorem 2 [27] : Consider the reduced mean field system (rMFG):
where is the Legendre transform [31] (with respect to the control) of the instantaneous cost function.
Suppose that is twice continuously differentiable with the respect to , and for all Then, there exists at most one smooth solution to the (rMFG).
Remark 7:
We have a number of observations and notes.
• The Hamiltonian function in the result above requires a special structure. Instead of a direct dependence on the entire mean field distribution , its dependence on the mean field is through the value of evaluated at state . • For global dependence on , a sufficiency condition for uniqueness can be found in [26] for the case where the Hamiltonian is separable, i.e., with monotone in and strictly convex in .
• The solution of (rMFG) can be unique even if the above conditions are violated. Further, the uniqueness condition is independent of the horizon of the game.
• For the linear-quadratic mean field case, it has been shown in [4] that the normalized system may have a unique i.i.d. solution or infinitely many solutions depending on the system parameters. See also [6] for recent analysis on risk-neutral linear-quadratic mean-field games using the stochastic maximum principle.
The next result provides the counterpart of Theorem 2 in the risk-sensitive case. It provides sufficient conditions for having at most one smooth solution in the risk-sensitive mean-field system by exploiting the presence of the additive quadratic term (which is strictly convex in ).
Theorem 3: Consider the risk-sensitive (reduced) mean field system (RS-rMFG). Let , and be twice continuously differentiable in , satisfying the following conditions:
• is strictly convex in .
• is decreasing in .
• . Then, (RS-rMFG) has at most one smooth solution.
Proof: See Appendix II. Remark 8: We observe that in contrast to Theorem 2 (riskneutral case), the sufficiency condition for having at most one smooth solution in (RS-rMFG) now depends on the variance term.
V. NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATION
In this section, we provide two numerical examples to illustrate the risk-sensitive mean-field game under affine state dynamics and McKean-Vlasov dynamics.
A. Affine State Dynamics
We let Player 's state evolution be described by a decoupled stochastic differential equation
The risk-sensitive cost functional is given by where are positive parameters; hence coupling of the players is only through the cost. The optimal strategy of Player has the form of (13) where is a solution to the Riccati differential equation Fig. 1 , we show the evolution of the distribution , and in Figs. 2 and 3 , we show the mean and the variance of the distribution which affects the optimal strategies in (13) . The optimal linear feedback is illustrated in Fig. 4 . We note that the mean value monotonically decreases from 1.0 and hence the unit cost on state is monotonically increasing. As the state cost increases, the control effort becomes relatively cheaper and therefore we can observe an increase in the magnitude of . However, when the mean value goes beyond 1.08, we observe that the control effort reduces to avoid undershooting in the state.
B. McKean-Vlasov Dynamics
We let the dynamics of an individual player be (14) and take the risk-sensitive cost function to be
Note that in this case the cost function is independent of other players' controls or states. As , under regularity conditions where and . Letting , we compute the solution to be We let , , , and depict in Fig. 5 the evolution of the probability density function . The evolutions of themean and the variance are shown in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 , respectively.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have studied risk-sensitive mean-field stochastic differential games with state dynamics described by an Itô stochastic differential equation and the cost function being the expected value of an exponentiated integral.
Using a particular structure of state dynamics, we have shown that the mean-field limit of the individual state dynamics leads to a controlled macroscopic McKean-Vlasov equation. We have formulated a risk-sensitive mean-field response framework, and established its compatibility with the density distribution using the controlled Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov forward equation. The risk-sensitive mean-field equilibria are characterized in terms of coupled backward-forward equations. For the general case, obtaining a solution to the resulting mean-field system (numerically or analytically) is very challenging, even if the number of equations have been reduced. We have, however, provided generic explicit forms in the particular case of the affine-exponentiated-Gaussian mean-field problem. In addition, we have shown that the risk-sensitive problem can be transformed into a risk-neutral mean-field game with the introduction of an additional fictitious player. This allows one to study a novel class of mean field games, robust mean-field games, under the Isaacs condition.
An interesting direction that we leave for future research is to extend the model to accommodate multiple classes of players and a drift function which may depend on the other players' controls. Another direction would be to soften the conditions under which Proposition 5 is valid, such as boundedness and Lipschitz continuity, and extend the result to games with nonsmooth coefficients. In this context, one could address a mean field central limit question on the asymptotic behavior of the process . Yet another extension would be to the time average risk-sensitive cost functional. Finally, the approach needs to be compared with other risk-sensitive approaches such as the mean-variance criterion, and extended to the case where the drift is a nonlinear function of the state-mean field and the control-mean field.
APPENDIX I BACKGROUND ON INDISTINGUISHABILITY
In this appendix, we provide an overview of the fundamental result on mean-field convergence of indistinguishable processes in a general setup. Let be a complete and separable metric space, which is a Polish space. Let be the set of permutations of . The collection is indistinguishable or exchangeable if for every permutation , the new collection has the same distribution. The infinite sequence is indistinguishable if for any finite subcollection is indistinguishable. For indistinguishable (or exchangeable) processes, the convergence of the empirical measure has been widely studied. This sits at the intersection between group theory and probability theory. The symmetry group properties have beenused to derive some properties of the distributions of the processes. The next theorem provides the mean-field convergence of such a process.
Theorem 4 (de Finetti-Hewitt-Savage): Let , be an indistinguishable sequence of -valued random variables. Then there is a -valued random variable such that where denotes the space of probability measures on . Moreover, conditioned on the random measure , one has for any fixed natural number , and a collection of measurable bounded functions defined on the state space . Theorem 4 has been proved by de Finetti (1931) [12] for infinite binary sequences and has been extended by Hewitt and Savage (1955) [17] to continuous and compact state spaces. A simple and elegant proof can be found in Aldous (1985) [2, pp. 18-22] , for the general state space.
APPENDIX II PROOFS
Proof of Proposition 5:
Under the stated standard assumptions on the drift and variance , the forward stochastic differential equation has a unique solution adapted to the filtration generated by the Brownian motions. We want to show that where is a positive number which only depends on the bounds, , and the Lipschitz constants of the coefficients of the drifts and the variance term. First we observe that for a fixed control , the averaging terms and are measurable, bounded and Lipschitz with the respect to the state and uniformly with the respect to time.
Second, we observe that the bound on the Lipschitz constants of the coefficients do not depend on the population size .
Hence, and are bounded and Lipschitz uniformly with the respect to . Moreover, these coefficients are deterministic. This means that there is a unique solution to the limiting SDE and that the solution is measurable with the filtration generated by the mutually independent Brownian motions.
Third, we evaluate the gap between the coefficients in order to obtain an estimate of the two processes. We start by evaluating the gap Notice that returns a -dimensional vector and belongs to . By reordering the above expression (in 2-norm), we obtain where denotes the variance of and is a bound on the th component of the drift term (this exists because we have assumed boundedness conditions on the coefficients).
Following a similar reasoning, we obtain the bounds on the second term in , i.e., where is a bound on the entry of the matrix . The difference between and can be expressed in integral form as and the deviation in terms of variance terms can be written as We now apply the following standard decompositions to estimate SDEs:
Next, using the Lispchitz conditions and boundedness assumptions, we arrive at where is a Lipschitz constant of . We take the sum over and integrate over time . Then, using the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality and the boundedness property of , we obtain a recursive equation for . Using the standard Gronwall estimates we deduce that the mean of the quadratic gap between the two stochastic processes (starting from at time 0) is in order of .
Proof of Theorem 1:
Under the stated regularity and boundedness assumptions, there is a solution to the McKean-Vlasov equation. Suppose that (i) and (ii) are satisfied. Then, is the solution of the mean-field limit state dynamics, i.e., the macroscopic McKean-Vlasov PDE when is substituted into the HJB equation. By fixing , we obtain a new HJB equation for the mean-field stochastic game. Since the new PDE admits a solution according to (ii), the control minimizing , is a best response to at time . The optimal response of the individual player generates a mean-field limit which in law is a solution of the FPK PDE and the players compute their controls as a function of this mean field. Thus, the consistency between the control, the state and the mean field is guaranteed by assumption (i). It follows that is a solution to the fixed-point problem i.e., a mean-field equilibrium, and a strongly time-consistent one. Now, we look at the quadratic instantaneous cost case. In that case, we obtain the risk-sensitive equations provided in Proposition 3. The fact that any convergent subsequence of best-response to is a best response to and the fact that is an -best response to the mean-field limit follow from mean-field convergence of order and the continuity of the risk-sensitive quadratic cost functional.
Proof of Theorem 3:
We provide a sufficient condition for the risk-sensitive mean field game to have at most one smooth solution. Suppose , and is positive constant. Let be the Hamiltonian associated with the risk-neutral mean field system. Then the Hamiltonian for the risk-sensitive mean-field system is . Assume that the dependence on is local, i.e., it is function of . The generic expression for the optimal control is given by (note that the generic feedback control is expressed in terms of , and not of ).
Suppose that there exist two smooth solutions , to the (normalized) risk-sensitive mean-field system. Now, consider the function . Observe that this function is 0 at time because the measures coincide initially, and the function is equal to 0 at time because the final values coincide. Therefore, the function will be identically 0 in if we can show that it is monotone. This will imply that the integrand is zero, and hence one of the two terms or should be 0. Then, if the measures are identical, we use the HJB equation to obtain the result. If the value functions are identical, we can use the FPK equation to show the uniqueness of the measure. Thus, it remains to find a sufficient condition for monotonicity, that is, a sufficient condition under which the quantity is monotone in time. We compute the following time derivative:
We interchange the order of the integral and the differentiation and use time derivative of a product to arrive at Now we expand the first term . Consider the two HJB equations
To compute , we take the difference between the two HJB equations above and multiply by , which leads to Then, the monotonicity follows, and this completes the proof.
